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Random quantum circuit samplers have been
used to demonstrate the exponential speed-up
of quantum processors beyond what is tractable
classically [1]. However, useful applications for
these samplers have so far been elusive. Here,
we propose random circuit as efficient devices for
protecting the output of a quantum computer.
We consider a scenario where the server per-
forms universal fault-tolerant quantum computa-
tion and the user gains access to the output using
a pseudo-random circuit. We show that a private
key much smaller than the size of the output may
prevent unauthorised access. For an n-qubit com-
putation, a standard approach requires an n-bit
key to scramble the state. We provide an infor-
mation-theoretic proof showing that obfuscation
can be achieved with order n−Hmin(X) secret bits,
where Hmin(X) is the min-entropy of the output
of the computation. As interesting computations
are expected to have large min-entropy, this rep-
resents a substantial reduction of the key size.
Demonstrating the exponential advantage of quantum
computers over their classical counterpart has been
the driving force behind recent developments in quan-
tum computation. The first evidence of “quantum
supremacy” came in the form of complexity-theoretic
proofs [2] that there exist tasks that can be executed ex-
ponentially faster on a quantum processor than a classi-
cal one. These tasks include Boson Sampling [3], Fourier
Sampling [4], and random circuit sampling [1], with ei-
ther commuting gates, known as instantaneous quan-
tum polynomial-time computation [5, 6], or with non-
commuting gates [7, 8]. These computational tasks do
not need to be useful to show the power of quantum
computation [7]. A noisy random circuit sampler demon-
strating the exponential speed up was implemented re-
cently by Google on superconducting qubits [1]. The
question remains how this device can be used for practi-
cal quantum information processing tasks.
In the future, fault-tolerant quantum computers will
be capable of important computational tasks. We imag-
ine quantum computers as devices servicing many dis-
tributed users, where the latter may have limited com-
puting capability, or may not know the algorithm that is
realised by the server. In this scenario, we anticipate the
need to encrypt the output of a quantum computer. To
realise this task, we consider a protocol for short-distance
private-key encryption between a quantum computer and
its authorised user. Unlike blind quantum computation
[9–12], which is concerned with untrusted hardware and
verification, our goal is to prevent unauthorised users
from gaining access to the quantum computer’s output.
We propose that a pseudo-random circuit can effi-
ciently obfuscate the output of a universal quantum com-
puter. In particular, we show that this can be realised
efficiently using only Clifford gates, which can be made
fault tolerant much more easily than the full universal
gate set used by the quantum computer [13]. We assume
that the user has the ability to apply the non-universal
set of Clifford gates in a fault-tolerant way, and can im-
plement measurements in the computational basis.
The server concatenates a pseudo-random circuit with
the circuit that implements a useful, fault-tolerant, quan-
tum algorithm, as shown in Fig. 1. The authorized user
applies the inverse circuit and measures the qubits in the
computational basis. In order to achieve secure encryp-
tion, we require that only a negligible amount of informa-
tion is obtained by a non-authorized user who does not
know the private key and attempts to measure the out-
put of the encrypted quantum computation. Note that
the security does not rely on the computational complex-
ity of random circuits. This is a feature of the protocol,
since it does not make any assumptions about the com-
putational capacity of the unauthorised user, who may
have unlimited computational power.
The output of an n-qubit quantum computation can
be encrypted in many different ways. One could encrypt
and then decrypt the classical data obtained after the
measurement using a one-time pad, which would require
a secret key of n bits [14]. Otherwise, one could encrypt
the quantum state |ψ〉 before the measurement. Per-
fect encryption obtained with the quantum one-time pad
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FIG. 1. Circuit layout for the encryption protocol. A useful
computation U is concatenated with the encryption, a pseudo-
random quantum circuit C. The authorised User applies the
unitary V = C† and correctly decrypts the encryption. An
unauthorized User/adversary can attempt to extract informa-
tion by performing an arbitrary measurement.
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2would require a secret key of 2n bits [15]. Approximate
encryption, one that encrypts the quantum state up to 
probability of failure, would instead require a secret key
of O(n) + O(log 1/) bits [15, 16]. These protocols re-
quire that the encrypted state be virtually indistinguish-
able from the maximally mixed state. Expressed in terms
of the trace norm, ‖ρ − 2−n1 ‖ ≤ 0, for some small 0.
However, the output of a quantum computation typically
contains the answer to a meaningful question. For our
purposes, we may simply require that an unauthorised
user does not obtain the correct answer. This opens the
possibility of performing the encryption in a much more
efficient way.
In this paper we show that quantum data locking [15–
20] can be exploited to achieve approximate encryption
using order n−Hmin(X) secret bits, where Hmin(X) is the
min-entropy of the output of the computation. It is natu-
ral to expect any useful quantum computation to be clas-
sically hard to simulate, therefore one has no information
on the output prior to the measurement. This implies
that the output has high entropy, therefore Hmin(X) ∼ n.
In this case n−Hmin(X) can be substantially smaller than
n. This suggests that the encryption can be implemented
much more efficiently than previously thought.
I. RELATION TO OTHER WORKS
The security of the encryption protocol relies on the phe-
nomenon of quantum data locking, first introduced by
DiVincenzo et al. [17]. Applications of quantum data
locking have been mostly focused on quantum commu-
nication. Previous works have applied quantum data
locking, for example, to two legitimate users exchang-
ing information through a wiretapped channel. In order
to apply quantum data locking in this context, it is as-
sumed that the eavesdropper measures before the honest
parties perform classical post-processing. This requires
that the eavesdropper has limited quantum memory [21].
The application considered here is not subject to the
limited quantum memory assumption. The goal of the
attacker is to replace the authorised user, and not to
wiretap a communication channel. Therefore, there is no
loss of generality in having the attacker perform a mea-
surement, since that is required to obtain the output of
the quantum computer. Also, note that we do not require
any classical post-processing by the authorised user and
server. This is because fault-tolerant quantum comput-
ing includes error correction at the algorithm level, and
it is not done a posteriori as in quantum key distribution
[22].
To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first to
explicitly consider an application to secure the output of
a quantum computation. The proof method builds on,
improves, and generalises techniques previously applied
in Refs. [23–25].
Other known quantum data locking protocols and se-
curity proofs could be used to encrypt a quantum com-
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FIG. 2. Number of secret bits (logK in Eq. (15)) required to
lock an n-qubit output of a quantum computer, for  = 10−8
and different values of Hmin: Hmin = n (red solid line), 0.8n
(green dotted-dashed line) and 0.6n (blue dotted line). For
comparison, we plot the approximate state-randomization in
Ref. [15] (purple dashed line with circles), and the quantum
one-time pad [15] (black line with stars).
puter. Some of them, however, would be limited to the
case where Hmin(X) is equal to n [15, 18, 19, 23, 24]. For
example, Fawzi et al. [18, 19] showed an explicit and effi-
cient construction that can encrypt n bits of information
using a key of O(log (n) log (n/)) bits, with a leakage of
no more than n bits. However, this construction cannot
be made fault-tolerant [18]. The approach of Dupuis et
al. [26] can account for non-maximal min-entropy, and
would yield results similar to Eqs. (16)-(17), but it relies
on sampling unitaries from the Haar distribution, thus
requiring an exponential number of gates with respect
to the system size [27]. In contrast, here we are using
an approximate 2-design, which in turn can be sampled
using only Clifford gates.
II. THE ENCRYPTION PROTOCOL
We consider a scenario where a server has the capacity of
performing large scale fault-tolerant universal quantum
computation, and the user is capable of performing fault-
tolerant Clifford circuits. The encryption protocol is then
defined as follows:
1. The server and the authorised user share a uncondi-
tionally secure secret key of logK bits.
2. In advance, the server and user (publicly) agree
upon a set of K n-qubit pseudo-random circuits,
{Ck}k=1,...,K . These circuits are composed of Clifford
gates only.
3. To encrypt the output of a quantum computer, the
server applies the Clifford circuit corresponding to the
unique unitary Ck associated with the private key.
34. The authorised user, who knows the private key, ap-
plies C−1k and measures the output in the computa-
tional basis to complete the quantum computation.
III. PSEUDO-RANDOM QUANTUM CIRCUITS
Unlike works that considered the uniform ensemble of
random unitaries induced by the Haar measure (see e.g.,
[15, 18, 19]), here we apply pseudo-random unitaries from
an approximate 2-design (defined below). This ensemble
of unitaries has also been used in other applications re-
lated to information obfuscation, most notably system
decoupling [28]. Recall that [29–31] given a δ > 0 and
the vectors |α〉 and |β〉 in d dimensions, a δ-approximate
t-design is a set of unitary operators C such that
(1− δ)M` ≤ E
[|〈α|C|β〉|2`] ≤ (1 + δ)M` , (1)
for all ` ≤ t, where E denotes the expectation value over
the t-design, and
M` =
`!(d− 1)!
(`+ d− 1)! (2)
is the `-th moment of the uniform distribution induced
by the Haar measure, i.e., M` = EHaar[|〈α|C|β〉|2`].
Given an n-qubit circuit, a δ-approximate 2-design
can be achieved with O(n(n + log 1/δ)) two-qubit Clif-
ford gates [32], or O(n log2 n) random U(4) gates [27].
It is known [7] that calculating the output amplitude
|〈α|C|β〉|2 is #P-hard. There are known codes that im-
plement the Clifford group in a straightforward fault-
tolerant manner [13, 33]. Since supplementing the Clif-
ford group with fault tolerant gates into a universal set
of gates is highly non-trivial, this means that a user who
can implement only Clifford gates may benefit from del-
egating the quantum computation to the server.
Important quantities considered here are the first and
second moments E
[|〈α|C|β〉|2], and E [|〈α|C|β〉|4] . The
ratio
γ :=
E
[|〈α|C|β〉|4]
E [|〈α|C|β〉|2]2 , (3)
quantifies the spread of the random variable |〈α|C|β〉|2
around its average. For δ-approximate 2-designs we can
bound γ from above as
γ ≤ 2d(1 + δ)
(d+ 1)(1− δ)2 ≤ 2
1 + δ
(1− δ)2 . (4)
This coefficient will play a fundamental role in our anal-
ysis, and we will use this bound to estimate the required
length of the private key.
IV. THE MODEL
Suppose the quantum computer is used to solve a partic-
ular problem whose solution space has cardinality M .
Different outputs of the quantum computation corre-
spond to different quantum states, denoted as |ψx〉 (with
x = 1, ...,M). We develop our analysis within the
subspace of fault-tolerant computation that incorporates
quantum error correction [34–36]. Therefore, the states
|ψx〉 are assumed to be quantum error-corrected. We fur-
ther assume that different outputs are associated with a
prior probability pX(x), and that the output states |ψx〉
are (approximately) mutually orthogonal. Therefore, the
uncertainty in the measurement outcome is well quanti-
fied by the min-entropy Hmin(X) = − log maxx pX(x).
From the point of view of the legitimate user (U) who
knows the private key, the a priori description of the out-
put of the computation is given by the statistical mixture
ρU =
M∑
x=1
pX(x) |ψx〉 〈ψx| . (5)
The description of this is different for an unauthorised
User (U′) who does not know the private key:
ρU′ =
1
K
K∑
k=1
M∑
x=1
pX(x)Ck |ψx〉 〈ψx|C†k . (6)
Below we show that, if K is large enough, the unautho-
rized user can extract only a negligible amount of infor-
mation from the state ρU′ .
Similar to other works on quantum data locking
[15, 17, 20, 23–25, 37], we use the accessible information
Iacc(X;U
′) to quantify the potential information leakage.
This quantity represents the maximum number of bits
an unauthorised user can obtain about the output of the
computation. We anticipate that similar results could be
obtained using other metrics, see e.g., [18, 19, 38].
For any given measurement MU′→Y applied on the
quantum state in Eq. (6), one can consider the mutual
information I(X;Y) between the output of the quan-
tum computation and the measurement result of the
unauthorised user. Recall that the mutual information
between two random variables X and Y is I(X;Y) =
H(Y) − H(Y|X) where H(Y|X) is the conditional Shan-
non entropy. The mutual information vanishes when X
and Y are statistically independent and reaches its max-
imum when they are perfectly correlated. The accessible
information is then defined as
Iacc(X;U
′) = max
MU→Y
I(X;Y) , (7)
where the maximization is over all possible measurements
MU′→Y applied on the state ρU′ . We require that the ad-
versary’s information is small not just for one particular
measurement, but for all possible measurements they can
perform.
4V. SKETCH OF SECURITY PROOF
Proving the security of the encryption scheme relies on
showing that Iacc(X;U
′) can be made arbitrarily small
if K is large enough. This also allows us to quantify
the minimal length of the private key that ensures secure
encryption. To show this, we first write the accessible
information as the difference of two entropies,
Iacc(X;U
′) = max
MU′→Y
H(Y)−H(Y|X) , (8)
and then show that H(Y) ' H(Y|X) for all measurement
MU′→Y. The proof shows that for a random choice of K
unitaries, one obtains Iacc(X;U
′) ≤ 2n with probability
arbitrarily close to 1.
In general, the measurement map MU′→Y is char-
acterised by POVM elements Λy, such that Λy ≥ 0,∑
y Λy = I. However, it is known that the optimal mea-
surement has unit rank [17], i.e., the POVM elements
take the form Λy = αy|φy〉〈φy|, where φy are unit vec-
tors, and αy are positive numbers such that
∑
y αy = 2
n.
The outcomes of the measurement are distributed ac-
cording to the probability distribution
pY(y) = αy 〈φy|ρU′ |φy〉 , (9)
with ρU′ given in Eq. (6). For given x, the conditional
probability of a measurement outcome is
pY|X=x(y) = αy 〈φy|ρxU′ |φy〉 , (10)
with
ρxU′ =
1
K
K∑
k=1
Ck|ψx〉〈ψx|C†k . (11)
The accessible information in Eq. (8) is then given by
Iacc(X;U
′) = max
MU′→Y
{
−
∑
y
pY(y) log pY(y) +
∑
xy
pX(x)pY|X=x(y) log pY|X=x(y)
}
= max
MU′→Y
∑
y
αy
{
−〈φy|ρU′ |φy〉 log 〈φy|ρU′ |φy〉+
∑
x
pX(x)〈φy|ρxU′ |φy〉 log 〈φy|ρxU′ |φy〉
}
. (12)
The security proof proceeds by showing that for in-
creasingK, both pY and pY|X=x concentrate towards their
common expectation value, and that the probability of
a deviation larger than  is exponentially suppressed.
Therefore both the entropy H(Y) and the conditional
entropy H(Y|X) will tend to the same value.
We show that both terms in the curly brackets in Eq.
(12) are arbitrarily close to 〈φy|ρ¯U′ |φy〉 log 〈φy|ρ¯U′ |φy〉 for
all vectors φy, with ρ¯U′ := 2
−nI the n-qubit maximally
mixed state. The relative minus sign between the terms
then implies that I(X;Y) can be made arbitrarily small.
To show this we follow the method in Ref. [25] using tail
bounds.
First, we show, using the matrix Chernoff bound [39],
that ρU′ is close to ρ¯U′ . Assuming K is large enough, with
near unit probability we have ρU′ ≤ (1 + )ρ¯U′ = (1 +
)2−nI. From this inequality we find that 〈φ |ρU′ |φ〉 ≤
(1 + )2−n uniformly in φ. For a random choice of the
unitaries, the probability that this inequality is violated
is smaller than
P1 := exp
{
n ln 2−K 
2
4
2−n
pmax
}
, (13)
(see Appendix A for details). Next, we apply a tail bound
due to Maurer [40]. We show that, for given φ and x,
〈φ|ρxU′ |φ〉 ≥ (1 − )〈φ|ρ¯U′ |φ〉 = 2−nI. This inequality
needs to be extended to all codewords and to (almost)
all values of x. In this way we obtain that, for a random
choice of the unitaries, the inequality is verified up to a
probability smaller than
P2 := exp
(
2d ln
(
20× 2n

)
+
 lnM
4pmax
− K
3
128γpmax
)
,
(14)
where γ has been defined in Eq. (3) (see Appendix B for
details). Putting these two results together, we obtain
I(X;Y) ≤ 2∑y αy2−nn. Since ∑y αy2−n = 1, we fi-
nally find I(X;Y) ≤ 2n. This bound on the accessible
information hold probabilistically, but the likelihood of
failure can be made arbitrary small for large enough K.
Specifically, the probability of failure is no larger than
P1 + P2. Therefore, it can be bounded away from 1 by
chosing K such that
K > max
{
4n×2npmax ln 2
2 ,
128γ
3
[
2n+1pmax ln
(
20×2n

)
+  lnM4
]
.
(15)
VI. RESULTS
We have shown that for a random choice of K uni-
tary transformations, the accessible information is upper
5bounded by a negligible number of bits 2n,
Iacc(X;U
′) ≤ 2n , (16)
provided that
logK = log γ + n−Hmin(X) +O(log n) +O(log 1/) .
(17)
Note that the secret key length depends on the coefficient
γ introduced in Eq. (3). For an approximate 2-design
using the bound in Eq. (4), we obtain
logK ≤ 1 + n−Hmin(X) + log 1 + δ
(1− δ)2
+O(log n) +O(log 1/) .
(18)
We assume that the computation needs to be run only
once (or only few times, since the algorithms are designed
to succeed with high probability). Compared to standard
encryption which needs n-bits, we can encrypt the output
using order n−Hmin bits. Since one typically has no prior
information on X, one can assume that the distribution
is flat and Hmin ≈ n. This means that the size of the key
for encryption may stay almost constant regardless of
the size of the computation, which leads to a potentially
exponential reduction.
We plot Eq. (18) in Fig. (2), where the exact value of K
is given by Eq. (15), for  = 10−8 and different values of
Hmin. Our protocol out-performs exact and approximate
one-time pad Ref. [15] when n ' 50, and the advantage
increases with increasing n.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
Universal quantum computers promise a vast improve-
ment in computational power. There are propositions
as to what near-term quantum processors might be ca-
pable of [41–44]. In this paper we have considered the
use of a random circuit sampler to encrypt the output
of a quantum computer. Unlike blind quantum compu-
tation, which is concerned with untrusted hardware and
verification, we focus on preventing unauthorised users
gaining access to the output of a quantum algorithm.
We have considered a scenario where a server can re-
alise fault-tolerant universal quantum computing. The
user must be capable only of implementing fault-tolerant
Clifford gates, and measurements in the computational
basis. Quantum computation using only fault-tolerant
Clifford gates require orders of magnitude fewer physical
qubits than universal fault-tolerant quantum computing
[45, 46], making it much more accessible to a wide user
base than fully fault tolerant universal quantum comput-
ing.
To construct the security of the quantum computer
output, we exploit the benefits of quantum data lock-
ing while circumventing its known weaknesses. We have
presented an information-theoretic proof that quantum
circuits in the Clifford group can secure a n-qubit quan-
tum algorithm with ξ ' n −Hmin(X) secret bits, where
Hmin(X) is the min-entropy of the measurement outcome.
Note that useful quantum algorithms are expected to be
classically hard to simulate, therefore have high entropy,
i.e., Hmin(X) ∼ n. These output states then can be en-
crypted with ξ  n secret bits. This would mean that
encryption can be obtained with a much shorter private
key than previously thought.
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Appendix A: Application of the matrix Chernoff bound
The matrix Chernoff bound states the following (which can be obtained directly from Theorem 19 of Ref. [39]):
Theorem 1 Let {Xt}t=1,...,K be K i.i.d. d-dimensional Hermitian-matrix-valued random variables, with Xt ∼ X,
0 ≤ X ≤ R, and E[X] = 2−nI. Then, for  ≥ 0:
Pr
{
1
K
K∑
t=1
Xt 6≤ (1 + )E[X]
}
≤ d exp
{
−KD
[
(1 + )
2−n
R
∥∥∥∥2−nR
]}
, (A1)
where Pr{x} denotes the probability that the proposition x is true, and D[u‖v] = u ln (u/v)−(1−u) ln [(1− u)/(1− v)].
Note that for  < 1
D
[
(1 + )
2−n
R
∥∥∥∥2−nR
]
≥ 
2
4
2−n
R
. (A2)
We apply the Chernoff bound to the K independent random variables
Xk ≡ Ck
M∑
x=1
pX(x)|ψx〉〈ψx|C†k . (A3)
7Note that these operators satisfy 0 ≤ Xk ≤ pmax := maxx pX(x). Therefore, R ≡ pmax. Also note that
1
K
K∑
k=1
Xk =
1
K
K∑
k=1
Ck
M∑
x=1
pX(x)|ψx〉〈ψx|C†k = ρU′ , (A4)
and E[X] = ρ¯U′ = 2−nI. By applying the Chernoff bound we then obtain
Pr
{
ρU′ 6≤ (1 + )2−n
} ≤ 2n exp{−K 2
4
2−n
pmax
}
= exp
{
n ln 2−K 
2
4
2−n
pmax
}
. (A5)
In conclusion, we have obtained that, up to a probability smaller than
P1 := exp
{
n ln 2−K 
2
4
2−n
pmax
}
, (A6)
the following matrix inequality holds:
ρU′ ≤ (1 + )2−n . (A7)
Appendix B: Application of the Maurer bound
We apply a concentration inequality obtained by Maurer in Ref. [40]:
Theorem 2 Let {Xk}k=1,...,K be K i.i.d. non-negative real-valued random variables, with Xk ∼ X and finite first
and second moments, E[X],E[X2] <∞. Then, for any τ > 0 we have that
Pr
{
1
K
K∑
k=1
Xk < (1− τ)E[X]
}
≤ exp
(
−Kτ
2E[X]2
2E[X2]
)
. (B1)
For any given x and φ, we apply this bound to the random variables
Xk ≡ |〈φ|Ck|ψx〉|2 . (B2)
Note that
1
K
K∑
k=1
Xk = 〈φ|ρxU′ |φ〉 , (B3)
and
E[X] = ρ¯U′ = 2−nI . (B4)
The application of the Maurer tail bound then yields
Pr
{〈φ|ρxU′ |φ〉 < (1− τ)2−n} ≤ exp(−Kτ22γ
)
. (B5)
with γ as defined in Eq. (3).
The probability bound in Eq. (B5) refers to one given value of x. Here we extend it to ` < M distinct values
x1, x2, . . . , x`. We have
Pr
{∀x = x1, x2, . . . x`, 〈φ|ρxU′ |φ〉 < (1− τ)2−n} ≤ exp(−`Kτ22γ
)
. (B6)
This follows from two observations. First, for different values of x, the random variables 〈φ|ρxU′ |φ〉 are identically
distributed. Second, these variables are not statistically independent as they obey the sub-normalization constraint∑
x〈φ|ρxU′ |φ〉 = c ≤ 1. If the ` random variables x1, x2, . . . , x` were statistically independent, then Eq. (B6) would
8hold. However, Eq. (B6) still holds because the normalization constraint implies that the variables are anti-correlated.
Therefore, the probability that they are all small is smaller than if they were statistically independent.
We now extend the concentration inequality to all possible choices of ` values of x. This amount to a total of
(
M
`
)
events. Applying the union bound we obtain
Pr
{∃x1, x2, . . . x`, | ∀x = x1, x2, . . . x`, 〈φ|ρxU′ |φ〉 < (1− τ)2−n} ≤ (M`
)
exp
(
−`Kτ
2
2γ
)
. (B7)
This implies that up to a probability smaller than
(
M
`
)
exp
(
− `Kτ22γ
)
, 〈φ|ρxU′ |φ〉 ≥ (1− τ)2−n for at least M − ` values
of x, which yields
M∑
x=1
pX(x)〈φ|ρxU′ |φ〉 log 〈φ|ρxU′ |φ〉 ≤
 ∑
x∈SM−`
pX(x)
 (1− τ)2−n log (1− τ)2−n , (B8)
where SM−` denotes the set of M − ` least likely values of x. Note that∑
x∈SM−`
pX(x) = 1−
∑
x∈L`
pX(x) ≥ 1− `pmax , (B9)
where L` is the subset of the ` most likely values of x, and pmax = maxx pX(x). Putting this into Eq. (B8) yields
M∑
x=1
pX(x)〈φ|ρxU′ |φ〉 log 〈φ|ρxU′ |φ〉 ≤ (1− ` pmax) (1− τ)2−n log (1− τ)2−n (B10)
≤ − (1− ` pmax) (1− τ)2−nn . (B11)
Finally, putting ` = τ/pmax we obtain
M∑
x=1
pX(x)〈φ|ρxU′ |φ〉 log 〈φ|ρxU′ |φ〉 ≤ (1− τ)22−nn = (1− 2τ)2−nn+O(τ2) . (B12)
To extend to all vectors φ, we exploit the notion of δ-net and closely follows Ref. [15]. In this way we obtain
Pr
{∀φ, ∃x1, x2, . . . x`, | ∀x = x1, x2, . . . x`, 〈φ|ρxU′ |φ〉 < (1− 2τ)2−n} ≤ (5× 2nτ
)2d(
M
`
)
exp
(
−`Kτ
2
2γ
)
. (B13)
